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ABSTRACT
Internet memes are increasingly used to sway and manipulate pub-
lic opinion. This prompts the need to study their propagation, evo-
lution, and in￿uence across the Web. In this paper, we detect and
measure the propagation of memes across multiple Web commu-
nities, using a processing pipeline based on perceptual hashing
and clustering techniques, and a dataset of 160M images from 2.6B
posts gathered from Twitter, Reddit, 4chan’s Politically Incorrect
board (/pol/), and Gab, over the course of 13 months. We group
the images posted on fringe Web communities (/pol/, Gab, and
The_Donald subreddit) into clusters, annotate them using meme
metadata obtained from Know Your Meme, and also map images
from mainstream communities (Twitter and Reddit) to the clusters.
Our analysis provides an assessment of the popularity and diver-
sity of memes in the context of each community, showing, e.g., that
racist memes are extremely common in fringe Web communities.
We also ￿nd a substantial number of politics-related memes on both
mainstream and fringeWeb communities, supporting media reports
that memes might be used to enhance or harm politicians. Finally,
we use Hawkes processes to model the interplay between Web
communities and quantify their reciprocal in￿uence, ￿nding that
/pol/ substantially in￿uences the meme ecosystem with the number
of memes it produces, while The_Donald has a higher success rate
in pushing them to other communities.
CCS CONCEPTS
• General and reference→ General conference proceedings;
Measurement; •Mathematics of computing→Multivariate
statistics; • Networks→ Social media networks; Online so-
cial networks; •Computingmethodologies→Neural networks;
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Web has become one of the most impactful vehicles for the
propagation of ideas and culture. Images, videos, and slogans are
created and shared online at an unprecedented pace. Some of these,
commonly referred to as memes, become viral, evolve, and eventu-
ally enter popular culture. The term “meme” was ￿rst coined by
Richard Dawkins [11], who framed them as cultural analogues to
genes, as they too self-replicate, mutate, and respond to selective
pressures [17]. Numerousmemes have become integral part of Inter-
net culture, with well-known examples including the Trollface [49],
Bad Luck Brian [25], and Rickroll [44].
While most memes are generally ironic in nature, used with no
bad intentions, others have assumed negative and/or hateful con-
notations, including outright racist and aggressive undertones [71].
These memes, often generated by fringe communities, are being
“weaponized” and even becoming part of political and ideological
propaganda [61]. For example, memes were adopted by candidates
during the 2016 US Presidential Elections as part of their iconogra-
phy [18]; in October 2015, then-candidate Donald Trump retweeted
an image depicting him as Pepe The Frog, a controversial character
considered a hate symbol [53]. In this context, polarized communi-
ties within 4chan and Reddit have been working hard to create new
memes and make them go viral, aiming to increase the visibility of
their ideas—a phenomenon known as “attention hacking” [59].
Despite their increasingly relevant role, we have very little mea-
surements and computational tools to understand the origins and
the in￿uence of memes. The online information ecosystem is very
complex; social networks do not operate in a vacuum but rather
in￿uence each other as to how information spreads [74]. However,
previous work (see Sec. 6) has mostly focused on social networks
in an isolated manner.
In this paper, we aim to bridge these gaps by identifying and
addressing a few research questions, which are oriented towards
fringe Web communities: 1) How can we characterize memes, and
how do they evolve and propagate? 2) Can we track meme propa-
gation across multiple communities and measure their in￿uence?
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3) How can we study variants of the same meme? 4) Can we char-
acterize Web communities through the lens of memes?
Our work focuses on four Web communities: Twitter, Reddit,
Gab, and 4chan’s Politically Incorrect board (/pol/), because of their
impact on the information ecosystem [74] and anecdotal evidence of
them disseminating weaponized memes [65]. We design a process-
ing pipeline and use it over 160M images posted between July 2016
and July 2017. Our pipeline relies on perceptual hashing (pHash)
and clustering techniques; the former extracts representative fea-
ture vectors from the images encapsulating their visual peculiarities,
while the latter allow us to detect groups of images that are part
of the same meme. We design and implement a custom distance
metric, based on both pHash and meme metadata, obtained from
Know Your Meme (KYM), and use it to understand the interplay
between the di￿erent memes. Finally, using Hawkes processes, we
quantify the reciprocal in￿uence of each Web community with
respect to the dissemination of image-based memes.
Findings. Some of our ￿ndings (among others) include:
(1) Our in￿uence estimation analysis reveals that /pol/ and
The_Donald are in￿uential actors in the meme ecosystem,
despite their modest size. We ￿nd that /pol/ substantially
in￿uences the meme ecosystem by posting a large number
of memes, while The_Donald is the most e￿cient commu-
nity in pushing memes to both fringe and mainstream Web
communities.
(2) Communities within 4chan, Reddit, and Gab use memes to
share hateful and racist content. For instance, among the
most popular cluster of memes, we ￿nd variants of the anti-
semitic “Happy Merchant” meme [32] and the controversial
Pepe the Frog [40].
(3) Our custom distance metric e￿ectively reveals the phylo-
genetic relationships of clusters of images. This is evident
from the graph that shows the clusters obtained from /pol/,
Reddit’s The_Donald subreddit, and Gab available for explo-
ration at [1].
Contributions. First, we develop a robust processing pipeline for
detecting and tracking memes across multiple Web communities.
Based on pHash and clustering algorithms, it supports large-scale
measurements of meme ecosystems. Second, we introduce a custom
distance metric, geared to highlight hidden correlations between
memes and better understand the interplay and overlap between
them. Third, we provide a characterization of multiple Web commu-
nities (Twitter, Reddit, Gab, and /pol/) with respect to the memes
they share, and an analysis of their reciprocal in￿uence using the
Hawkes Processes statistical model. Finally, we release our pro-
cessing pipeline and datasets (available at [3]), hence supportting
further measurements in this space.
2 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we present our methodology for measuring the
propagation of memes across Web communities.
2.1 Overview
Memes are high-level concepts or ideas that spread within a cul-
ture [11]. In Internet vernacular, a meme usually refers to variants
of a particular image, video, cliché, etc. that share a common theme
Cluster	1 Cluster	N
Image
Smug	Frog	Meme
Figure 1: An example of a meme (Smug Frog) that provides an intu-
ition of what an image, a cluster, and a meme is.
and are disseminated by a large number of users. In this paper, we
focus on their most common incarnation: static images.
To gain an understanding of how memes propagate across the
Web, with a particular focus on discovering the communities that
are most in￿uential in spreading them, our intuition is to build
clusters of visually similar images, allowing us to track variants of
a meme. We then group clusters that belong to the same meme
to study and track the meme itself. In Fig. 1, we provide a visual
representation of the Smug Frog meme [47], which includes many
variants of the same image and several clusters of variants. Cluster 1
has variants from a Jurassic Park scene, where one of the characters
is hiding from two velociraptors behind a kitchen counter: the frogs
are stylized to look similar to velociraptors, and the character hiding
varies to express a particular message. For example, in the image
in the top right corner, the two frogs are searching for an anti-
semitic caricature of a Jew. Cluster N shows variants of the smug
frog wearing a Nazi o￿cer military cap with the infamous “Arbeit
macht frei” in the background. Overall, these clusters represent the
branching nature of memes: as a new variant of a meme becomes
prevalent, it often branches into its own sub-meme, potentially
incorporating imagery from other memes.
2.2 Processing Pipeline
We now introduce our processing pipeline; see Fig. 2. As discussed
in Sec. 2.1, our methodology aims at identifying clusters of similar
images and assign them to higher level groups, which are the actual
memes. Note that the proposed pipeline is not limited to image
macros and can be used to identify any image. We ￿rst discuss the
types of data sources needed for our approach, i.e., meme annota-
tion sites and Web communities that post memes (dotted rounded
rectangles in the ￿gure). Then, we describe each of the operations
performed by our pipeline (Steps 1-7, see regular rectangles).
Data Sources. Our pipeline uses two types of data sources: 1) sites
providing meme annotation and 2) Web communities that dissemi-
nate memes. In this paper, we use Know Your Meme for the former,
and Twitter, Reddit, /pol/, and Gab for the latter (see Sec. 3). How-
ever, our methodology supports any annotation site and any Web
community, and this is why we add the “Generic” sites/communities
notation in Fig. 2.
pHashExtraction (Step 1).Weuse the Perceptual Hashing (pHash)
algorithm [60] to calculate a ￿ngerprint of each image in such a
way that any two images that look similar to the human eye map
to a “similar” hash value. pHash generates a feature vector of 64 el-
ements that describe an image, computed from the Discrete Cosine
Transform among the di￿erent frequency domains of the image.
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Figure 2: High-level overview of our processing pipeline.
Thus, visually similar images have minor di￿erences in their vec-
tors. For example, the string representation of the phashes obtained
from the images in cluster N (see Fig. 1) are 55352b0b8d8b5b53,
55952b0bb58b5353, and 55952b2b9da58a53, respectively. The al-
gorithm is also robust against changes in the images, e.g., signal
processing operations and direct manipulation [75], and e￿ectively
reduces the dimensionality of the raw images.
Clustering via pairwise distance calculation (Steps 2-3).Next,
we cluster images from one or more Web Communities using the
pHash values. We perform a pairwise comparison of all the pHashes
using Hamming distance (Step 2). To support large numbers of
images, we implement a highly parallelizable system on top of
TensorFlow [5], which uses multiple GPUs to enhance performance.
Images are clustered using a density-based algorithm (Step 3). Our
current implementation uses DBSCAN [14], mainly because it can
discover clusters of arbitrary shape and performs well over large,
noisy datasets. Nonetheless, our architecture can be easily tweaked
to support any clustering algorithm and distance metric.
We also perform an analysis of the clustering performance and
the rationale for selecting the clustering threshold. We refer to
Appendix A for more details.
Screenshots Removal (Step 4). Meme annotation sites like KYM
often include, in their image galleries, screenshots of social network
posts that are not variants of a meme but just comments about it.
Hence, we discard social-network screenshots from the annotation
sites data sources using a deep learning classi￿er. Due to space
limitations, we refer to Appendix C of the extended version of the
paper [73] for details on the classi￿er.
Cluster Annotation (Steps 5). Clustering annotation uses the
medoid of each cluster, i.e., the element with the minimum square
average distance from all images in the cluster. In other words, the
medoid is the image that best represents the cluster. The clusters’
medoids are compared with all images from meme annotation sites,
by calculating the Hamming distance between each pair of pHash
vectors. We consider that an image matches a cluster if the distance
is less than or equal to a threshold   , which we set to 8, as it allows
us to capture the diversity of images that are part of the same meme
while maintaining a low number of false positives.
As the annotation process considers all the images of a KYM
entry’s image gallery, it is likely we will get multiple annotations
for a single cluster. To ￿nd the representative KYM entry for each
cluster, we select the one with the largest proportion of matches of
KYM images with the cluster medoid. In case of ties, we select the
one with the minimum average Hamming distance.
As KYM is based on community contributions it is unclear how
good our annotations are. To evaluate KYM entries and our cluster
annotations, three authors of this paper assessed 200 annotated
clusters and 162 KYM entries. We ￿nd that only a 1.85% of the
assessed KYM entries were regarded as “bad” or not su￿cient.
When it comes to the clustering annotation, we note that the three
annotators had substantial agreement (Fleis agreement score equal
to 0.67) and that the clustering accuracy, after majority agreement,
of the assessed clusters is 89% . We refer to Appendix B for details
about the annotation process and results.
Association of images to memes (Step 6). To associate images
posted onWeb communities (e.g., Twitter, Reddit, etc.) tomemes, we
compare them with the clusters’ medoids, using the same threshold
  . This is conceptually similar to Step 5, but uses images from
Web communities instead of images from annotation sites. This
lets us identify memes posted in generic Web communities and
collect relevant metadata from the posts (e.g., the timestamp of a
tweet). Note that we track the propagation of memes in generic
Web communities (e.g., Twitter) using a seed of memes obtained
by clustering images from other (fringe) Web communities. More
speci￿cally, our seeds will be memes generated on three fringe Web
communities (/pol/, The_Donald subreddit, Gab); nonetheless, our
methodology can be applied to any community.
Analysis and In￿uence Estimation (Step 7).We analyze all rel-
evant clusters and the occurrences of memes, aiming to assess:
1) their popularity and diversity in each community; 2) their tem-
poral evolution; 3) how communities in￿uence each other with
respect to meme dissemination (see Sec. 4 and 5).
2.3 Distance Metric
To better understand the interplay and connections between the
clusters, we introduce a custom distance metric, which relies on
both the visual peculiarities of the images (via pHash) and data
available from annotation sites. The distance metric supports one of
two modes: 1) one for when both clusters are annotated (full-mode),
and 2) another for when one or none of the clusters is annotated
(partial-mode).
De￿nition. Let c be a cluster of images and F a set of features
extracted from the clusters. The custom distance metric between
cluster ci and c j is de￿ned as:
distance(ci , c j ) = 1  
’
f2F
wf ⇥ rf (ci , c j ) (1)
where rf(ci , c j ) denotes the similarity between the features of type
f 2 F of cluster ci and c j , and wf is a weight that represents the
relevance of each feature. Note thatÕf wf = 1 and rf (ci , c j ) = {x 2
R | 0  x  1}. Thus, distance(ci , c j ) is a number between 0 and 1.
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Features.We consider four di￿erent features for rf2F, speci￿cally,
F = {perceptual ,meme,people, culture}; see below.
rperceptual : this feature is the similarity between two clusters from
a perceptual viewpoint. Let h be a pHash vector for an imagem in
cluster c , wherem is the medoid of the cluster, anddi j the Hamming
distance between vectors hi and hj (see in Step 5). We compute
di j from ci and c j as follows. First, we obtain obtain the medoid
mi from cluster ci . Subsequently, we obtain hi=pHash(mi ). Finally,
we compute di j=Hamming(hi ,hj ). We simplify notation and use d
instead of di j to denote the distance between two medoid images
and refer to this distance as the Hamming score.
We de￿ne the perceptual similarity between two clusters as an
exponential decay function over the Hamming score d :
rperceptual (d ) = 1   d  ⇥ emax/  (2)
where max represents the maximum pHash distance between two
images and   is a constant parameter, or smoother, that controls how
fast the exponential function decays for all values of d (recall that
{d 2 R | 0  d  max}). Note that max is bound to the precision
given by the pHash algorithm. Recall that each pHash has a size of
|d |=64, hence max=64. Intuitively, when   << 64, rperceptual is a
high value only with perceptually indistinguishable images, e.g., for
 =1, two images with d=0 have a similarity rperceptual=1.0. With
the same   , the similarity drops to 0.4when d=1. By contrast, when
  is close to 64, rperceptual decays almost linearly. For example,
for  =64, rperceptual (d=0)=1.0 and rperceptual (d=1)=0.98. As
mentioned above, we observe that pairs of images with scores
between d=0 and d=8 are usually part of the same variant (see Step
5 in Sec. 2.2). In our implementation, we set  =25 as rperceptual
returns high values up to d=8, and rapidly decays thereafter.
rmeme , rculture , and rpeople : the annotation process (Step 5) pro-
vides contextualized information about the cluster medoid, includ-
ing the name (i.e., the main identi￿er) given to a meme, the associ-
ated culture (i.e., high-level group of meme), and people that are
included in a meme. (Note that we use all the annotations for each
category and not only the representative one, see Step 5.) Therefore,
we model a di￿erent similarity for each of the these categories, by
looking at the overlap of all the annotations among the medoids
of both clusters (mi , mj , for ci and c j , respectively). Speci￿cally,
for each category, we calculate the Jaccard index between the an-
notations of both medoids, for memes, cultures, and people, thus
acquiring rmeme , rculture , rpeople , respectively.
Modes. Our distance metric measures how similar two clusters are.
If both clusters are annotated, we operate in “full-mode,” and in
“partial-mode” otherwise. For each mode, we use di￿erent weights
for the features in Eq. 1, which we set empirically as we lack the
ground-truth data needed to automate the computation of the opti-
mal set of thresholds.
Full-mode. In full-mode, we set weights as follows. 1) The features
from the perceptual and meme categories should have higher rele-
vance than people and culture, as they are intrinsically related to the
de￿nition of meme (see Sec. 2.1). The last two are non-discriminant
features, yet are informative and should contribute to the metric.
Also, 2) rmeme should not outweigh rperceptual because of the
relevance that visual similarities have on the di￿erent variants of
Platform #Posts #Posts with #Images #Unique
Images pHashes
Twitter 1,469,582,378 242,723,732 114,459,736 74,234,065
Reddit 1,081,701,536 62,321,628 40,523,275 30,441,325
/pol/ 48,725,043 13,190,390 4,325,648 3,626,184
Gab 12,395,575 955,440 235,222 193,783
KYM 15,584 15,584 706,940 597,060
Table 1: Overview of our datasets.
a meme. Likewise, rperceptual should not dominate over rmeme
because of the branching nature of the memes. Thus, we want these
two categories to play an equally important weight. Therefore, we
choosewperceptual=0.4,wmeme=0.4,wpeople=0.1,wculture=0.1.
This means that when two clusters belong to the same meme and
their medoids are perceptually similar, the distance between the
clusters will be small. In fact, it will be at most 0.2 = 1   (0.4 + 0.4)
if people and culture do not match, and 0.0 if they also match. Note
that our metric also assigns small distance values for the following
two cases: 1) when two clusters are part of the same meme variant,
and 2) when two clusters use the same image for di￿erent memes.
Partial-mode. In this mode, we associate unannotated images
with any of the known clusters. This is a critical component of our
analysis (Step 6), allowing us to study images from generic Web
communities where annotations are unavailable. In this case, we
rely entirely on the perceptual features. We once again use Eq. 1,
but simply set all weights to 0, except for wperceptual (which is
set to 1). That is, we compare the image we want to test with the
medoid of the cluster and we apply Eq. 2 as described above.
3 DATASETS
3.1 Web Communities
As mentioned earlier, our data sources are Web communities that
post memes and meme annotation sites. For the former, we focus on
four communities: Twitter, Reddit, Gab, and 4chan (more precisely,
4chan’s Politically Incorrect board, /pol/). This provides a mix of
mainstream social networks (Twitter and Reddit) as well as fringe
communities that are often associated with the alt-right and have
an impact on the information ecosystem (Gab and /pol/) [74].
There are several other platforms playing important roles in
spreading memes, however, many are “closed” (e.g., Facebook) or do
not involve memes based on static images (e.g., YouTube, Giphy). In
future work, we plan to extend our measurements to communities
like Instagram and Tumblr, as well as to GIF and video memes.
Nonetheless, we believe our data sources already allow us to elicit
comprehensive insights into the meme ecosystem.
Table 1 reports the number of posts and images processed for
each community. Note that the number of images is lower than the
number of posts with images because of duplicate image URLs and
because some images get deleted. Next, we discuss each dataset.
Twitter. Twitter is a mainstream microblogging platform, allowing
users to broadcast 280-character messages (tweets) to their follow-
ers. Our Twitter dataset is based on tweets made available via the
1% Streaming API, between July 1, 2016 and July 31, 2017. In total,
we parse 1.4B tweets: 242M of them have at least one image. We
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extract all the images, ultimately collecting 114M images yielding
74M unique pHashes.
Reddit. Reddit is a news aggregator: users create submissions by
posting a URL and others can reply in a structured way. It is divided
into multiple sub-communities called subreddits, each with its own
topic and moderation policy. Content popularity and ranking are
determined via a voting system based on the up- and down-votes
users cast. We gather images from Reddit using publicly available
data from Pushshift [62]. We parse all submissions and comments1
between July 1, 2016 and July, 31 2017, and extract 62M posts that
contain at least one image. We then download 40M images produc-
ing 30M unique pHashes.
4chan. 4chan is an anonymous image board; users create new
threads by posting an image with some text, which others can reply
to. It has two characteristic features: anonymity and ephemeral-
ity. By default, user identities are concealed, and all threads are
deleted after one week. Overall, 4chan is known for its extremely
lax moderation and the high degree of hate and racism, especially
on boards like /pol/ [20]. We obtain all threads posted on /pol/,
between July 1, 2016 and July 31, 2017, using the same methodology
of [20]. Since all threads (and images) are removed after a week, we
use a public archive service called 4plebs [4] to collect 4.3M images,
thus yielding 3.6M unique pHashes.
Gab. Gab is a social network launched in August 2016 as a “cham-
pion” of free speech, providing “shelter” to users banned from
other platforms. It combines social networking features from Twit-
ter (broadcast of 300-character messages) and Reddit (content is
ranked according to up- and down-votes). It also has extremely lax
moderation as it allows everything except illegal pornography, ter-
rorist propaganda, and doxing [66]. Overall, Gab attracts alt-right
users, conspiracy theorists, and trolls, and high volumes of hate
speech [72]. We collect 12M posts, posted on Gab between August
10, 2016 and July 31, 2017, and 955K posts have at least one image,
using the same methodology as in [72]. Out of these, 235K images
are unique, producing 193K unique pHashes.
Ethics. Although we only collect publicly available data, our study
has been approved by the designated ethics o￿cer at UCL. Since
4chan content is typically posted with expectations of anonymity,
we have encrypted data at rest, while making no attempt to de-
anonymize users.
3.2 Meme Annotation Site
Know Your Meme (KYM). We choose KYM as the source for
meme annotation as it o￿ers a comprehensive database of memes.
KYM is a sort of encyclopedia of Internet memes: for each meme, it
provides information such as its origin (i.e., the platform on which
it was ￿rst observed), the year it started, as well as descriptions
and examples. In addition, for each entry, KYM provides a set of
keywords, called tags, that describe the entry. KYM provides a va-
riety of higher-level categories that group meme entries; namely,
cultures, subcultures, people, events, and sites. “Cultures” and “sub-
cultures” entries refer to a wide variety of topics ranging from video
games to various general categories. For example, the Rage Comics
subculture [42] is a higher level category associated with memes
1See [64] for metadata associated with submissions and comments.
(a) Images (b) Origins
Figure 3: Basic statistics from the KYM dataset. We omit some cat-
egories (i.e., Sites, Events, and Subcultures) from Fig. 3(a) for read-
ability purposes.
related to comics like Rage Guy [43] or LOL Guy [34], while the
Alt-right culture [22] gathers entries from a loosely de￿ned seg-
ment of the right-wing community. The rest of the categories refer
to speci￿c individuals (e.g., Donald Trump [29]), speci￿c events
(e.g.,#CNNBlackmail [27]), and sites (e.g., /pol/ [41]), respectively. It
is also worth noting that KYM moderates all entries, hence entries
that are wrong or incomplete are marked as so by the site.
As of May 2018, the site has 18.3K entries, speci￿cally, 14K
memes, 1.3K subcultures, 1.2K people, 1.3K events, and 427 web-
sites [35]. We crawl KYM between October and December 2017,
acquiring data for 15.6K entries; for each entry, we also download
all the images related to it by crawling all the pages of the image
gallery. In total, we collect 707K images corresponding to 597K
unique pHashes. Note that we obtain 15.6K out of 18.3K entries, as
we crawled the site several months before May 2018.
Getting to know KYM.We also perform a general characteriza-
tion of KYM. First, we look at the distribution of entries across
categories: as expected, the majority (57%) are memes, followed
by subcultures (30%), cultures (3%), websites (2%), and people (2%).
Next, we measure the number of images per entry: as shown in
Fig. 3(a), this varies considerably (note log-scale on x-axis). KYM
entries have as few as 1 and as many as 8K images, with an average
of 45 and a median of 9 images. Larger values may be related to
the meme’s popularity, but also to the “diversity” of image variants
it generates. Upon manual inspection, we ￿nd that the presence
of a large number of images for the same meme happens either
when images are visually very similar to each other (e.g., Smug
Frog images within the two clusters in Fig. 1), or if there are actually
remarkably di￿erent variants of the same meme (e.g., images in
‘cluster 1’ vs. images in ‘cluster N’ in the same ￿gure). We also
note that the distribution varies according to the category: e.g.,
higher-level concepts like cultures include more images than more
speci￿c entries like memes.
We then analyze the origin of each entry: see Fig. 3(b). Note that
a large portion of the memes (28%) have an unknown origin, while
YouTube, 4chan, and Twitter are the most popular platforms with,
respectively, 21%, 12%, and 11%, followed by Tumblr and Reddit
with 8% and 7%. This con￿rms our intuition that 4chan, Twitter,
and Reddit, which are among our data sources, play an important
role in the generation and dissemination of memes. As mentioned,
we do not currently study video memes originating from YouTube,
due to the inherent complexity of video-processing tasks as well
as scalability issues. However, a large portion of YouTube memes
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Platform #Images Noise #Clusters #Clusters with
KYM tags (%)
/pol/ 4,325,648 63% 38,851 9,265 (24%)
T_D 1,234,940 64% 21,917 2,902 (13%)
Gab 235,222 69% 3,083 447 (15%)
Table 2: Statistics obtained from clustering images from /pol/,
The_Donald, and Gab.
actually end up being morphed into image-based memes (see, e.g.,
the Overly Attached Girlfriend meme [39]).
3.3 Running the pipeline on our datasets
For all four Web communities (Twitter, Reddit, /pol/, and Gab),
we perform Step 1 of the pipeline (Fig. 2), using the ImageHash
library [2]. We then perform Steps 2-3 (i.e., pairwise comparisons
between all images and clustering), for all the images from /pol/,
The_Donald subreddit, and Gab, as we treat them as fringe Web
communities. Note that, we exclude mainstream communities like
the rest of Reddit and Twitter as our main goal is to obtain clusters
of memes from fringe Web communities and later characterize all
communities by means of the clusters. Next, we go through Steps
4-5 using all the images obtained from meme annotation websites
(speci￿cally, Know Your Meme, see Sec. 3.2) and the medoid of each
cluster from /pol/, The_Donald, and Gab. Finally, Steps 6-7 use all
the pHashes obtained from Twitter, Reddit (all subreddits), /pol/,
and Gab to ￿nd posts with images matching the annotated clusters.
This is an integral part of our process as it allows to characterize
and study mainstream Web communities not used for clustering
(i.e., Twitter and Reddit).
4 ANALYSIS
In this section, we present a cluster-based measurement of memes
as well as an analysis of a few Web communities from the “perspec-
tive” of memes. We measure the prevalence of memes across the
clusters obtained from fringe communities: /pol/, The_Donald sub-
reddit (T_D), and Gab.We also use the distance metric introduced in
Eq. 1 to perform a cross-community analysis. Then, we group clus-
ters into broad, but related, categories to gain a macro-perspective
understanding of larger communities, including mainstream ones
like Reddit and Twitter.
4.1 Cluster-based Analysis
We start by analyzing the 12.6K annotated clusters consisting of
268K images from /pol/, The_Donald, and Gab (Step 5 in Fig. 2). We
do so to understand the diversity of memes in each Web commu-
nity, as well as the interplay between variants of memes. We then
evaluate how clusters can be grouped into higher structures using
hierarchical clustering and graph visualization techniques.
4.1.1 Clusters. Statistics. In Table 2, we report some basic statis-
tics of the clusters obtained for each Web community. A relatively
high percentage of images (63%–69%) are not clustered, i.e., are
labeled as noise. While in DBSCAN “noise” is just an instance that
does not ￿t in any cluster (more speci￿cally, there are less than 5
images with perceptual distance  8 from that particular instance),
we note that this likely happens as these images are not memes,
(a) (b)
Figure 4: CDF of KYM entries per cluster (a) and clusters per KYM
entry (b).
but rather “one-o￿ images.” For example, on /pol/ there is a large
number of pictures of random people taken from various social
media platforms.
Overall, we have 2.1M images in 63.9K clusters: 38K clusters for
/pol/, 21K for The_Donald, and 3K for Gab. 12.6K of these clusters
are successfully annotated using the KYM data: 9.2K from /pol/
(142K images), 2.9K from The_Donald (121K images), and 447 from
Gab (4.5K images). Examples of clusters are reported in Appendix D
of the extended version of the paper [73]. As for the un-annotated
clusters, manual inspection con￿rms that many include miscella-
neous images unrelated to memes, e.g., similar screenshots of social
networks posts (recall that we only ￿lter out screenshots from the
KYM image galleries), images captured from video games, etc.
KYM entries per cluster. Each cluster may receive multiple anno-
tations, depending on the KYM entries that have at least one image
matching that cluster’s medoid. As shown in Fig. 4(a), the majority
of the annotated clusters (74% for /pol/, 70% for The_Donald, and
58% for Gab) only have a single matching KYM entry. However,
a few clusters have a large number of matching entries, e.g., the
one matching the Conspiracy Keanu meme [28] is annotated by
126 KYM entries (primarily, other memes that add text in an image
associated with that meme). This highlights that memes do overlap
and that some are highly in￿uenced by other ones.
Clusters per KYM entry.We also look at the number of clusters
annotated by the same KYM entry. Fig. 4(b) plots the CDF of the
number of clusters per entry. About 40% only annotate a single
/pol/ cluster, while 34% and 20% of the entries annotate a single
The_Donald and a single Gab cluster, respectively. We also ￿nd
that a small number of entries are associated to a large number of
clusters: for example, the Happy Merchant meme [32] annotates
124 di￿erent clusters on /pol/. This highlights the diverse nature
of memes, i.e., memes are mixed and matched, not unlike the way
that genetic traits are combined in biological reproduction.
Top KYM entries. Because the majority of clusters match only
one or two KYM entries (Fig. 4(a)), we simplify things by giving
all clusters a representative annotation based on the most prevalent
annotation given to the medoid, and, in the case of ties the average
distance between all matches (see Sec. 2.2). Thus, in the rest of the
paper, we report our ￿ndings based on the representative annotation
for each cluster.
In Table 3, we report the top 20 KYM entries with respect to
the number of clusters they annotate. These cover 17%, 23%, and
27% of the clusters in /pol/, The_Donald, and Gab, respectively,
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/pol/ T_D Gab
Entry Category Clusters (%) Entry Category Clusters (%) Entry Category Clusters (%)
Donald Trump People 207 (2.2%) Donald Trump People 177 (6.1%) Donald Trump People 25 (5.6%)
Happy Merchant Memes 124 (1.3%) Smug Frog Memes 78 (2.7%) Happy Merchant Memes 10 (2.2%)
Smug Frog Memes 114 (1.2%) Pepe the Frog Memes 63 (2.1%) Demotivational Posters Memes 7 (1.5%)
Computer Reaction Faces Memes 112 (1.2%) Feels Bad Man/ Sad Frog Memes 61 (2.1%) Pepe the Frog Memes 6 (1.3%)
Feels Bad Man/ Sad Frog Memes 94 (1.0%) Make America Great Again Memes 50 (1.7%) #Cnnblackmail Events 6 (1.3%)
I Know that Feel Bro Memes 90 (1.0%) Bernie Sanders People 31 (1.0%) 2016 US election Events 6 (1.3%)
Tony Kornheiser’s Why Memes 89 (1.0%) 2016 US Election Events 27 (0.9%) Know Your Meme Sites 6 (1.3%)
Bait/This is Bait Memes 84 (0.9%) Counter Signal Memes Memes 24 (0.8%) Tumblr Sites 6 (1.3%)
#TrumpAnime/Rick Wilson Events 76 (0.8%) #Cnnblackmail Events 24 (0.8%) Feminism Cultures 5 (1.1%)
Reaction Images Memes 73 (0.8%) Know Your Meme Sites 20 (0.7%) Barack Obama People 5 (1.1%)
Make America Great Again Memes 72 (0.8%) Angry Pepe Memes 18 (0.6%) Smug Frog Memes 5 (1.1%)
Counter Signal Memes Memes 72 (0.8%) Demotivational Posters Memes 18 (0.6%) rwby Subcultures 5 (1.1%)
Pepe the Frog Memes 65 (0.7%) 4chan Sites 16 (0.5%) Kim Jong Un People 5 (1.1%)
Spongebob Squarepants Subcultures 61 (0.7%) Tumblr Sites 15 (0.5%) Murica Memes 5 (1.1%)
Doom Paul its Happening Memes 57 (0.6%) Gamergate Events 15 (0.5%) UA Passenger Removal Events 5 (1.1%)
Adolf Hitler People 56 (0.6%) Colbertposting Memes 15 (0.5%) Make America Great Again Memes 4 (0.9%)
pol Sites 53 (0.6%) Donald Trump’s Wall Memes 15 (0.5%) Bill Nye People 4 (0.9%)
Dubs Guy/Check’em Memes 53 (0.6%) Vladimir Putin People 15 (0.5%) Trolling Cultures 4 (0.9%)
Smug Anime Face Memes 51 (0.6%) Barack Obama People 15 (0.5%) 4chan Sites 4 (0.9%)
Warhammer 40000 Subcultures 51 (0.6%) Hillary Clinton People 15 (0.5%) Furries Cultures 3 (0.7%)
Total 1,638 (17.7%) 695 (23.9%) 121 (27.1%)
Table 3: Top 20 KYM entries appearing in the clusters of /pol/, The_Donald, and Gab. We report the number of clusters and their respective
percentage (per community). Each item contains a hyperlink to the corresponding entry on the KYM website.
apustaja sad-frog savepepe pepe smug-frog-a smug-frog-b anti-meme
Figure 5: Inter-cluster distance between all clusters with frog memes. Clusters are labeled with the origin (4 for 4chan, D for The_Donald, and
G for Gab) and the meme name. To ease readability, we do not display all labels, abbreviate meme names, and only show an excerpt of all
relationships.
hence covering a relatively good sample of our datasets. Donald
Trump [29], Smug Frog [47], and Pepe the Frog [40] appear in the
top 20 for all three communities, while the Happy Merchant [32]
only in /pol/ and Gab. In particular, Donald Trump annotates the
most clusters (207 in /pol/, 177 in The_Donald, and 25 in Gab). In
fact, politics-related entries appear several times in the Table, e.g.,
Make America Great Again [36] as well as political personalities
like Bernie Sanders, Obama, Putin, and Hillary Clinton.
When comparing the di￿erent communities, we observe themost
prevalent categories are memes (6 to 14 entries in each community)
and people (2-5). Moreover, in /pol/, the 2nd most popular entry,
related to people, is Adolf Hilter, which supports previous reports
of the community’s sympathetic views toward Nazi ideology [20].
Overall, there are several memes with hateful or disturbing content
(e.g., holocaust). This happens to a lesser extent in The_Donald and
Gab: themost popular people after Donald Trump are contemporary
politicians.
Finally, image posting behavior in fringe Web communities is
greatly in￿uenced by real-world events. For instance, in /pol/, we
￿nd the #TrumpAnime controversy event [50], where a political
individual (Rick Wilson) o￿ended the alt-right community, Donald
Trump supporters, and anime fans (an oddly intersecting set of
interests of /pol/ users). Similarly, on The_Donald and Gab, we ￿nd
the #Cnnblackmail [27] event, referring to the (alleged) blackmail
of the Reddit user that created the infamous video of Donald Trump
wrestling the CNN.
4.1.2 Memes’ Branching Nature. Next, we study howmemes evolve
by looking at variants across di￿erent clusters. Intuitively, clusters
that look alike and/or are part of the same meme are grouped
together under the same branch of an evolutionary tree. We use the
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Figure 6: Visualization of the obtained clusters from /pol/,
The_Donald, and Gab. Note that memes with red labels are anno-
tated as racist, while memes with green labels are annotated as pol-
itics (see Section 4.2.1 for the selection criteria).
custom distance metric introduced in Sec. 2.3, aiming to infer the
phylogenetic relationship between variants of memes. Since there
are 12.6K annotated clusters, we only report on a subset of variants.
In particular, we focus on “frog” memes (e.g., Pepe the Frog [40]);
as discussed later in Sec. 4.2, this is one of the most popular memes
in our datasets.
The dendrogram in Fig. 5 shows the hierarchical relationship
between groups of clusters of memes related to frogs. Overall, there
are 525 clusters of frogs, belonging to 23 di￿erent memes. These
clusters can be grouped into four large categories, dominated by
di￿erent memes that express di￿erent ideas or messages: e.g., Apu
Apustaja depicts a simple-minded non-native speaker using broken
English, while the Feels Bad Man/Sad Frog (ironically) expresses
dismay at a given situation. The dendrogram also shows a variant
of Smug Frog (smug-frog-b) related to a variant of the Russian Anti
Meme Law [46] (anti-meme) as well as relationships between clus-
ters from Pepe the Frog and Isis meme [33], and between Smug Frog
and Brexit-related clusters [51], as shown in Appendix E in [73].
The distance metric quanti￿es the similarity of any two variants
of di￿erent memes; however, recall that two clusters can be close
to each other even when the medoids are perceptually di￿erent
(see Sec. 2.3), as in the case of Smug Frog variants in the smug-frog-
a and smug-frog-b clusters (top of Fig. 5). Although, due to space
constraints, this analysis is limited to a single “family” ofmemes, our
distance metric can actually provide useful insights regarding the
phylogenetic relationships of any clusters. In fact, more extensive
analysis of these relationships (through our pipeline) can facilitate
the understanding of the di￿usion of ideas and information across
the Web, and provide a rigorous technique for large-scale analysis
of Internet culture.
4.1.3 Meme Visualization. We also use the custom distance metric
(see Eq. 1) to visualize the clusters with annotations. We build a
graphG = (V ,E), where V are the medoids of annotated clusters
and E the connections between medoids with distance under a
threshold  . Fig. 6 shows a snapshot of the graph for   = 0.45,
chosen based on the frogs analysis above (see red horizontal line
in Fig. 5). In particular, we select this threshold as the majority of
the clusters from the same meme (note coloration in Fig. 5) are
hierarchically connected with a higher-level cluster at a distance
close to 0.45. To ease readability, we ￿lter out nodes and edges that
have a sum of in- and out-degree less than 10, which leaves 40%
of the nodes and 92% of the edges. Nodes are colored according to
their KYM annotation. NB: the graph is laid out using the OpenOrd
algorithm [58] and the distance between the components in it does
not exactly match the actual distance metric. We observe a large
set of disconnected components, with each component containing
nodes of primarily one color. This indicates that our distance metric
is indeed capturing the peculiarities of di￿erent memes. Finally,
note that an interactive version of the full graph is publicly available
from [1].
4.2 Web Community-based Analysis
We now present a macro-perspective analysis of the Web communi-
ties through the lens of memes. We assess the presence of di￿erent
memes in each community, how popular they are, and how they
evolve. To this end, we examine the posts from all four communi-
ties (Twitter, Reddit, /pol/, and Gab) that contain images matching
memes from fringe Web communities (/pol/, The_Donald, and Gab).
4.2.1 Meme Popularity. We start by analyzing clusters grouped by
KYM ‘meme’ entries, looking at the number of posts for each meme
in /pol/, Reddit, Gab, and Twitter. (We also include the analysis for
‘people’ entries in the extended version [73].)
In Table 4, we report the top 20 memes for each Web community
sorted by the number of posts. We observe that Pepe the Frog [40]
and its variants are among the most popular memes for every plat-
form. While this might be an artifact of using fringe communities as
a “seed” for the clustering, recall that the goal of this work is in fact
to gain an understanding of how fringe communities disseminate
memes and in￿uence mainstream ones. Thus, we leave to future
work a broader analysis of the wider meme ecosystem.
Sad Frog [31] is themost popular meme on /pol/ (4.9%), the 3rd on
Reddit (1.3%), the 10th on Gab (0.8%), and the 12th on Twitter (0.5%).
We also ￿nd variations like Smug Frog [47], Apu Apustaja [24],
Pepe the Frog [40], and Angry Pepe [23]. Considering that Pepe
is treated as a hate symbol by the Anti-Defamation League [53]
and that is often used in hateful or racist, this likely indicates that
polarized communities like /pol/ and Gab do use memes to incite
hateful conversation. This is also evident from the popularity of the
anti-semitic Happy Merchant meme [32], which depicts a “greedy”
and “manipulative” stereotypical caricature of a Jew (3.8% on /pol/
and 1.1% on Gab).
By contrast, mainstream communities like Reddit and Twitter
primarily share harmless/neutral memes, which are rarely used in
hateful contexts. Speci￿cally, on Reddit the top memes are Manning
Face [37] (2.2%) and That’s the Joke [48] (1.3%), while on Twitter
the top ones are Roll Safe [45] (5.9%) and Evil Kermit [30] (5.4%).
Once again, we ￿nd that users (in all communities) post memes
to share politics-related information, possibly aiming to enhance
or penalize the public image of politicians (see Appendix E of the
paper’s extended version [73] for an example of such memes). For
instance, we ￿ndMake America Great Again [36], a meme dedicated
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/pol/ Reddit Gab Twitter
Entry Posts (%) Entry Posts (%) Entry Posts (%) Entry Posts(%)
Feels Bad Man/Sad Frog 64,367 (4.9%) Manning Face 12,540 (2.2%) Jesusland (P) 454 (1.6%) Roll Safe 55,010 (5.9%)
Smug Frog 63,290 (4.8%) That’s the Joke 7,626 (1.3%) Demotivational Posters 414 (1.5%) Evil Kermit 50,642 (5.4%)
Happy Merchant (R) 49,608 (3.8%) Feels Bad Man/ Sad Frog 7,240 (1.3%) Smug Frog 392 (1.4%) Arthur’s Fist 37,591 (4.0%)
Apu Apustaja 29,756 (2.2%) Confession Bear 7,147 (1.3%) Based Stickman (P) 391 (1.4%) Nut Button 13,598 (1,5%)
Pepe the Frog 25,197 (1.9%) This is Fine 5,032 (0.9%) Pepe the Frog 378 (1.3%) Spongebob Mock 11,136 (1,2%)
Make America Great Again (P) 21,229 (1.6%) Smug Frog 4,642 (0.8%) Happy Merchant (R) 297 (1.1%) Reaction Images 9,387 (1.0%)
Angry Pepe 20,485 (1.5%) Roll Safe 4,523 (0.8%) Murica 274 (1.0%) Conceited Reaction 9,106 (1.0%)
Bait this is Bait 16,686 (1.2%) Rage Guy 4,491 (0.8%) And Its Gone 235 (0.9%) Expanding Brain 8,701 (0.9%)
I Know that Feel Bro 14,490 (1.1%) Make America Great Again (P) 4,440 (0.8%) Make America Great Again (P) 207 (0.8%) Demotivational Posters 7,781 (0.8%)
Cult of Kek 14,428 (1.1%) Fake CCG Cards 4,438 (0.8%) Feels Bad Man/ Sad Frog 206 (0.8%) Cash Me Ousside/Howbow Dah 5,972 (0.6%)
Laughing Tom Cruise 14,312 (1.1%) Confused Nick Young 4,024 (0.7%) Trump’s First Order of Business (P) 192 (0.7%) Salt Bae 5,375 (0.6%)
Awoo 13,767 (1.0%) Daily Struggle 4,015 (0.7%) Kekistan 186 (0.6%) Feels Bad Man/ Sad Frog 4,991 (0.5%)
Tony Kornheiser’s Why 13,577 (1.0%) Expanding Brain 3,757 (0.7%) Picardia (P) 183 (0.6%) Math Lady/Confused Lady 4,722 (0.5%)
Picardia (P) 13,540 (1.0%) Demotivational Posters 3,419 (0.6%) Things with Faces (Pareidolia) 156 (0.5%) Computer Reaction Faces 4,720 (0.5%)
Big Grin / Never Ever 12,893 (1.0%) Actual Advice Mallard 3,293 (0.6%) Serbia Strong/Remove Kebab 149 (0.5%) Clinton Trump Duet (P) 3,901 (0.4%)
Reaction Images 12,608 (0.9%) Reaction Images 2,959 (0.5%) Riot Hipster 148 (0.5%) Kendrick Lamar Damn Album Cover 3,656 (0.4%)
Computer Reaction Faces 12,247 (0.9%) Handsome Face 2,675 (0.5%) Colorized History 144 (0.5%) What in tarnation 3,363 (0.3%)
Wojak / Feels Guy 11,682 (0.9%) Absolutely Disgusting 2,674 (0.5%) Most Interesting Man in World 140 (0.5%) Harambe the Gorilla 3,164 (0.3%)
Absolutely Disgusting 11,436 (0.8%) Pepe the Frog 2,672 (0.5%) Chuck Norris Facts 131 (0.4%) I Know that Feel Bro 3,137 (0.3%)
Spurdo Sparde 9,581 (0.7%) Pretending to be Retarded 2,462 (0.4%) Roll Safe 131 (0.4%) This is Fine 3,094 (0.3%)
Total 445,179 (33.4%) 94,069 (16.7%) 4,808 (17.0%) 249,047 (26.4%)
Table 4: Top 20 KYM entries for memes that we ￿nd our datasets. We report the number of posts for each meme as well as the percentage
over all the posts (per community) that contain images that match one of the annotated clusters. The (R) and (P) markers indicate whether a
meme is annotated as racist or politics-related, respectively (see Section 4.2.1 for the selection criteria).
(a) all memes (b) racist
(c) politics
Figure 7: Percentage of posts per day in our dataset for all, racist,
and politics-related memes.
to Donald Trump’s US presidential campaign, among the topmemes
in /pol/ (1.6%), in Reddit (0.8%), and Gab (0.8%). Similarly, in Twitter,
we ￿nd the Clinton Trump Duet meme [26] (0.4%), a meme inspired
by the 2nd US presidential debate.
We further group memes into two high-level groups, racist and
politics-related. We use the tags that are available in our KYM
dataset, i.e., we assign a meme to the politics-related group if it
has the “politics,” “2016 us presidential election,” “presidential elec-
tion,” “trump,” or “clinton” tags, and to the racism-related one if
the tags include “racism,” “racist,” or “antisemitism,” obtaining 117
racist memes(4.4% of all memes that appear on our dataset) and
556 politics-related memes (21.2% of all memes that appear on our
dataset). In the rest of this section, we use these groups to further
study the memes, and later in Sec. 5 to estimate in￿uence.
4.2.2 Temporal Analysis. Next, we study the temporal aspects of
posts that contain memes from /pol/, Reddit, Twitter, and Gab. In
Fig. 7, we plot the percentage of posts per day that include memes.
For all memes (Fig. 7(a)), we observe that /pol/ and Reddit follow a
steady posting behavior, with a peak in activity around the 2016
US elections. We also ￿nd that memes are increasingly more used
on Gab (see, e.g., 2016 vs 2017).
As shown in Fig. 7(b), both /pol/ and Gab include a substantially
higher number of posts with racist memes, used over time with
a di￿erence in behavior: while /pol/ users share them in a very
steady and constant way, Gab exhibits a bursty behavior. A possible
explanation is that the former is inherently more racist, with the
latter primarily reacting to particular world events. As for political
memes (Fig. 7(c)), we ￿nd a lot of activity overall on Twitter, Reddit,
and /pol/, but with di￿erent spikes in time. On Reddit and /pol/, the
peaks coincide with the 2016 US elections. On Twitter, we note a
peak that coincides with the 2nd US Presidential Debate on October
2016. For Gab, there is again an increase in posts with political
memes after January 2017.
4.3 Take-Aways
In summary, the main take-aways of our analysis include:
(1) Fringe Web communities use many variants of memes re-
lated to politics and world events, possibly aiming to share
weaponized information about them (see Appendix E in
[73] for some examples of weaponized memes). For instance,
Donald Trump is the KYM entry with the largest number of
clusters in /pol/ (2.2%), The_Donald (6.1%), and Gab (2.2%).
(2) /pol/ and Gab share hateful and racist memes at a higher
rate than mainstream communities, as we ￿nd a consider-
able number of anti-semitic and pro-Nazi clusters (e.g., The
Happy Merchant meme [32] appears in 1.3% of all /pol/ anno-
tated clusters and 2.2% of Gab’s, while Adolf Hitler in 0.6% of
/pol/’s). This trend is steady over time for /pol/ but ramping
up for Gab.
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(3) Seemingly “neutral” memes, like Pepe the Frog (or one of its
variants), are used in conjunction with other memes to incite
hate or in￿uence public opinion on world events, e.g., with
images related to terrorist organizations like ISIS or world
events such as Brexit.
(4) Our custom distance metric successfully allows us to study
the interplay and the overlap of memes, as showcased by
the visualizations of the clusters and the dendrogram (see
Figs. 5 and 6).
5 INFLUENCE ESTIMATION
So far we have studied the dissemination of memes by looking at
Web communities in isolation. However, in reality, these in￿uence
each other: e.g., memes posted on one community are often re-
posted to another. Aiming to capture the relationship between them,
we use a statistical model known as Hawkes Processes [56, 57],
which describes how events occur over time on a collection of
processes. This maps well to the posting of memes on di￿erent
platforms: each community can be seen as a process, and an event
occurs each time ameme image is posted on one of the communities.
Events on one process can cause impulses that can increase the
likelihood of subsequent events, including other processes, e.g., a
person might see a meme on one community and re-post it, or
share it to a di￿erent one. This approach allow us to assess the
causality of events, hence it is a far better approach when compared
to simple approaches like looking at the timeline of speci￿c memes
or phashes.
5.1 Hawkes Processes
To model the spread of memes on Web communities, we use a
similar approach as in our previous work [74], which looked at the
spread of mainstream and alternative news URLs. Next, we provide
a brief description, and present an improved method for estimating
in￿uence.
We use ￿ve processes, one for each of our seedWeb communities
(/pol/, Gab, and The_Donald), as well as Twitter and Reddit, ￿tting
a separate model for each meme cluster. Fitting the model to the
data yields a number of values: background rates for each process,
weights from each process to each other, and the shape of the
impulses an event on one process causes on the rates of the others.
The background rate is the expected rate at which events will occur
on a process without in￿uence from the communities modeled or
previous events; this captures memes posted for the ￿rst time, or
those seen on a community we do not model and then reposted on
a community we do. The weights from community-to-community
indicate the e￿ect an event on one has on the others; for example,
a weight from Twitter to Reddit of 1.2 means that each event on
Twitter will cause an expected 1.2 additional events on Reddit.
The shape of the impulse from Twitter to Reddit determines how
the probability of these events occurring is distributed over time;
typically the probability of another event occurring is highest soon
after the original event and decreases over time.
Fig. 8 illustrates a Hawkes model with three processes. The ￿rst
event occurs on process B, which causes an increase in the rate
of events on all three processes. The second event then occurs on
process C, again increasing the rate of events on the processes.
1
2
3
4
Background rates
1 2 3 4
Impulses at
time of event
Attributed
root cause
A
B
C
B
B
BB
A
C
C
Figure 8: Representation of a Hawkes model with three processes.
Events cause impulses that increase the rate of subsequent events
in the same or other processes. By looking at the impulses present
when events occur, the probability of a process being the root cause
of an event can be determined. Note that on the second part of the
Figure, colors represent events while arrows represent impulses be-
tween the events.
The third event occurs soon after, on process A. The fourth event
occurs later, again caused by the background arrival rate on process
B, after the increases in arrival rate from the other events have
disappeared.
To understand the in￿uence di￿erent communities have on the
spread of memes, we want to be able to attribute the cause of a
meme being posted back to a speci￿c community. For example, if a
meme is posted on /pol/ and then someone sees it there and posts it
on Twitter where it is shared several times, we would like to be able
to say that /pol/ was the root cause of those events. Obviously, we
do not actually know where someone saw something and decided
to share it, but we can, using the Hawkes models, determine the
probability of each community being the root cause of an event.
Looking again at Fig. 8, we see that events 1 and 4 are caused
directly by the background rate of process B. This is because, in the
case of event 1, there are no previous events on other processes,
and in the case of event 4, the impulses from previous events have
already stopped. Events 2 and 3, however, occur when there are
multiple possible causes: the background rate for the community
and the impulses from previous events. In these cases, we assign the
probability of being the root cause in proportion to the magnitudes
of the impulses (including the background rate) present at the time
of the event. For event 2, the impulse from event 1 is smaller than
the background rate of community C, so the background rate has
a higher probability of being the cause of event 2 than event 1.
Thus, most of the cause for event 2 is attributed to community
C, with a lesser amount to B (through event 1). Event 3 is more
complicated: impulses from both previous events are present, thus
the probability of being the cause is split three ways, between the
background rate and the two previous events. The impulse from
event 2 is the largest, with the background rate and event 1 impulse
smaller. Because event 2 is attributed both to communities B and C,
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/pol/ Twitter Reddit T_D Gab
1,574,045 865,885 581,803 81,924 44,918
Table 5: Events per community from the 12.6K clusters.
Figure 9: Percent of the destination community’s racist (R) and non-
racist (NR) meme postings caused by the source community. Colors
indicate the percent di￿erence between racist and non-racist.
event 3 is partly attributed to community B through both event 1
and event 2.
In the rest of our analysis, we use this newmeasure. This is a sub-
stantial improvement over the in￿uence estimation in [74], which
used the weights from source to destination community, multiplied
by the number of events on the source to estimate in￿uence. How-
ever, this only looks at in￿uence across a single “hop” and would
not allow us to understand the source community’s in￿uence as
memes spread onwards from the destination community. The new
method allows us to gain an understanding of where memes that
appear on a community originally come from, and how they are
likely to spread from community to community from the original
source.
5.2 In￿uence
We ￿t Hawkes models using Gibbs sampling as described in [57] for
the 12.6K annotated clusters; in Table 5, we report the total number
of meme images posted to each community in these clusters. We
note that /pol/ has the greatest number of memes posted, followed
by Twitter and Reddit. Recall, however, that because our approach
is seeded with memes observed on /pol/, The_Donald, and Gab, it
is possible that there are memes on Twitter and Reddit that are not
included in the clusters. In addition, the raw number of images (not
necessarily memes) that appear on the di￿erent communities varies
greatly (see Table 1). This yields an additional interesting question:
how e￿cient are di￿erent communities at disseminating memes?
First, we report the source of events in terms of the percent of
events on the destination community. This describes the results
in terms of the data as we have collected it, e.g., it tells us the
percentage of memes posted on Twitter that were caused by /pol/.
The second way we report in￿uence is by normalizing the values
by the total number of events in the source community, which lets
us see how much in￿uence each community has, relative to the
number of memes they post—in other words, their e￿ciency.
Additional results are available in extended version of the pa-
per [73]; here we focus on the di￿erences in the ways communities
disseminate di￿erent types of meme, in particular, racist (non-racist)
and political (non-political) memes.
Using the clusters identi￿ed as either racist or non-racist (see the
end of Sec. 4.2.1), we compare how the communities in￿uence the
Figure 10: Percent of the destination community’s political (P) and
non-political (NP) meme postings caused by the source community.
Colors indicate the percent di￿erence between political and non-
political.
Figure 11: In￿uence from source to destination community of racist
and non-racist meme postings, normalized by the number of events
in the source community.
spread of these two types of content. Fig. 9 shows the percentage
of both the destination community’s racist and non-racist meme
posts caused by the source community. We perform two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests to compare the distributions of in￿uence
from the racist and non-racist clusters; cells with statistically sig-
ni￿cant di￿erences between in￿uence of racist/non-racist memes
(with p<0.01) are reported with a * in the ￿gure. /pol/ has the most
total in￿uence for both racist and non-racist memes, with the no-
table exception of Twitter, where Reddit has the most the in￿uence.
Interestingly, while the percentage of racist meme posts caused by
/pol/ is greater than non-racist for Reddit, Twitter, and Gab, this is
not the case for The_Donald. The only other cases where in￿uence
is greater for racist memes are Reddit to The_Donald and Gab to
Reddit.
When looking at political vs non political memes (Fig. 10), we
see a somewhat di￿erent story. Here, /pol/ in￿uences The_Donald
more in terms of political memes. Further, we see di￿erences in the
percent increase and decrease of in￿uence between the two ￿gures
(as indicated by the cell colors). For example, Twitter has a relatively
larger di￿erence in its in￿uence on /pol/ and Reddit for political
and non-political memes than for racist and non-racist memes, but
a smaller di￿erence in its in￿uence on Gab and The_Donald. This
exposes how di￿erent communities have varying levels of in￿uence
depending on the type of memes they post.
While examining the raw in￿uence provides insights into the
meme ecosystem, it obscures notable di￿erences in the meme post-
ing behavior of the di￿erent communities. To explore this, we look
at the normalized in￿uence in Fig. 11 (racist/non-racist memes) and
Fig. 12 (political/non-political memes). As mentioned previously,
normalization reveals how e￿cient the communities are in dissem-
inating memes to other communities by revealing the per meme
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Figure 12: In￿uence from source to destination community of po-
litical and non-political meme postings, normalized by the number
of events in the source community.
in￿uence of meme posts. First, we note that the percent change
in in￿uence for the dissemination of racist/non-racist memes is
quite a bit larger than that for political/non-political memes (again,
indicated by the coloring of the cells). More interestingly, both
￿gures show that, contrary to the total in￿uence, /pol/ is the least
in￿uential when taking into account the number of memes posted.
While this might seem surprising, it actually yields a subtle, yet
crucial aspect of /pol/’s role in the meme ecosystem: /pol/ (and
4chan in general) acts as an evolutionary microcosm for memes.
The constant production of new content [20] results in a “survival
of the ￿ttest” [15] scenario. A staggering number of memes are
posted on /pol/, but only the best actually make it out to other
communities. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ￿rst result
quantifying this analogy to evolutionary pressure.
Take-Aways. There are several take-aways from our measurement
of in￿uence. We show that /pol/ is, generally speaking, the most
in￿uential disseminator of memes in terms of raw in￿uence, In
particular, it is more in￿uential in spreading racist memes than
non-racist one, and this di￿erence is deeper than in any other com-
munity. There is one notable exception: /pol/ is more in￿uential
in terms of non-racist memes on The_Donald. Relatedly, /pol/ has
generally more in￿uence in terms of spreading political memes
than other communities. When looking at the normalized in￿u-
ence, however, we surface a more interesting result: /pol/ is the
least e￿cient in terms of in￿uence while The_Donald is the most
e￿cient. This provides new insight into the meme ecosystem: there
are clearly evolutionary e￿ects. Many meme postings do not re-
sult in further dissemination, and one of the key components to
ensuring they are disseminated is ensuring that new “o￿spring”
are continuously produced. /pol/’s “famed” meme magic, i.e., the
propensity to produce and heavily push memes, is thus the most
likely explanation for /pol/’s in￿uence on the Web in general.
6 RELATEDWORK
Detection and Propagation of Memes. Leskovec et al. [55] per-
form large-scale tracking of text-based memes, focusing on news
outlets and blogs. Ferrara et al. [16] detect text memes using an un-
supervised framework based on clustering techniques. Ratkiewicz
et al. [63] introduce Truthy, a framework supporting the analysis
of the di￿usion of text-based, politics-related memes on Twitter.
Babaei et al. [7] study Twitter users’ preferences, with respect to
information sources, including how they acquire memes. Dubey
et al. [13] extract a rich semantic embedding corresponding to the
template used for the creation of meme images. By contrast, we
focus on the detection and propagation of image-based memes with-
out limiting our scope to image macros. We also detect and study
the propagation of memes across multiple Web communities, using
publicly available data from memes annotation sites (i.e., KYM).
Popularity of Memes.Weng et al. [68, 69] study the popularity of
memes spreading as hashtags on Twitter. They model virality using
an agent-based approach, taking into account that users have a
limited capacity in receiving/viewingmemes on Twitter. They study
the features that make memes popular, ￿nding that those based on
network community structures are strong indicators of popularity.
Tsur and Rappoport [67] predict popularity of text-based memes
on Twitter using linguistic characteristics as well as cognitive and
domain features. Ienco et al. [21] study memes propagating via text,
images, audio, and video on the Yahoo! Meme platform (a platform
discontinued in 2012), aiming to predict virality and select memes
to be shown to users after login.
Whereas, we also study the popularity of memes, however, unlike
previous work, we rely on a multi-platform approach, encompass-
ing data from /pol/, Reddit, Twitter, and Gab, and show that the
popularity of memes depends on the Web community and its ideol-
ogy. For instance, /pol/ is well-known for its anti-semitic ideology
and in fact the “HappyMerchant” meme [32] is the 3rdmost popular
meme on /pol/.
Evolution of Memes. Adamic et al. [6] study the evolution of text-
based memes on Facebook, showing that it can be modeled by the
Yule process. They ￿nd that memes signi￿cantly evolve and new
variants appear as they propagate, and that speci￿c communities
within the network di￿use speci￿c variants of a meme. Bauck-
hage [8] study the temporal dynamics of 150 memes using data
from Google Insights as well as social bookmarking services like
Digg, showing that di￿erent communities exhibit di￿erent inter-
ests/behaviors for di￿erent memes, and that epidemiology models
can be used to predict the evolution and popularity of memes. By
contrast, we study the temporal aspect of memes using Hawkes pro-
cesses. This statistical framework allows us to assess the causality of
the posting of memes on various Web communities, thus modeling
their evolution and their in￿uence across multiple communities.
Case Studies. Heath et al. [19] present a case study of how people
perceive memes with a focus on urban legends, ￿nding that they
are more willing to share memes that evoke stronger disgust. Xie
et al. [70] focus on YouTube memes, performing a large-scale
keyword-based search for videos related to the Iranian election in
2009, extracting frequently used images and video segments. They
show that most of the videos are not original, thus, meme-related
techniques can be exploited to deduplicate content and capture
the content di￿usion on the Web. Finally, Dewan et al. [12] study
the sentiment and content of images that are disseminated during
crisis events like the 2015 Paris terror attacks. They analyze 57K
images related to the attacks, ￿nding instances of misinformation
and conspiracy theories.
We also present a case study focusing on image memes of Pepe
the Frog (see the discussion about Fig. 5). This showcases both the
overlap and the diversity of certain memes, as well as how memes
can be in￿uenced by real-world events, with new variants being
generated. For instance, after the UK Brexit referendum in 2016,
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memes with Pepe the Frog started to be used in the Brexit context
(see Appendix E in [73]).
Fringe Communities. Previous work has also shed light on fringe
Web communities like 4chan, Gab, and sub-communities within
Reddit. Bernstein et al. [9] study the ephemerality and anonymity
features of the 4chan community using data from the Random
board (/b/). Hine et al. [20] focus on /pol/, analyzing 8M posts and
detecting a high volume of hate speech as well as the phenomenon
of “raids,” i.e., coordinated attacks aimed at disrupting other services.
Zannettou et al. [72] analyze 22M posts from 336K users on Gab,
￿nding that hate speech occurs twice as much as in Twitter, but
twice less than /pol/. Snyder et al. [66] measure doxing on 4chan and
8chan, while Chandrasekharan et al. [10] introduce a computational
approach to detect abusive content also looking at 4chan and Reddit.
Finally, Hawkes processes have also been used to quantify in-
￿uence of fringe Web communities like /pol/ and The_Donald to
mainstream ones like Twitter in the context of misinformation [74].
We follow a similar approach here, but use an improved method of
determining the in￿uence of the di￿erent communities.
7 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a large-scale measurement study of the
meme ecosystem. We introduced a novel image processing pipeline
and ran it over 160M images collected from four Web communities
(4chan’s /pol/, Reddit, Twitter, and Gab). We clustered images from
fringe communities (/pol/, Gab, and Reddit’s The_Donald) based
on perceptual hashing and a custom distance metric, annotated the
clusters using data gathered from Know Your Meme, and analyzed
them along a variety of axes. We then associated images from all
the communities to the clusters to characterize them through the
lens of memes and the in￿uence they have on each other.
Our analysis highlights that the meme ecosystem is quite com-
plex, with intricate relationships between di￿erent memes and
their variants. We found important di￿erences between the memes
posted on di￿erent communities (e.g., Reddit and Twitter tend to
post “fun” memes, while Gab and /pol/ racist or political ones).
When measuring the in￿uence of each community toward dissemi-
nating memes to other Web communities, we found that /pol/ has
the largest overall in￿uence for racist and political memes, however,
/pol/ was the least e￿cient, i.e., in terms of in￿uence w.r.t. the total
number of memes posted, while The_Donald is very successful in
pushing memes to both fringe and mainstream Web communities.
Ourwork constitutes the ￿rst attempt to provide amulti-platform
measurement of the meme ecosystem, with a focus on fringe and
potentially dangerous communities. Considering the increasing rel-
evance of digital information on world events, our study provides a
building block for future cultural anthropology work, as well as for
building systems to protect against the dissemination of harmful
ideologies. Moreover, our pipeline can already be used by social
network providers to assist the identi￿cation of hateful content;
for instance, Facebook is taking steps to ban Pepe the Frog used in
the context of hate [54], and our methodology can help them auto-
matically identify hateful variants. Finally, our pipeline can be used
for tracking the propagation of images from any context or other
language spheres, provided an appropriate annotation dataset.
Additional Results. Due to space constraints, we focused on the
most salient results, leaving several to the extended version [73].
Some relevant “highlights” include: 1) Reddit posts including politi-
cal memes receive higher scores compared to non-political ones,
and those with racist memes lower scores than non-racist ones; 2) In
general, Reddit users are more interested in politics-related memes
than other types, while The_Donald is the most active subreddit
overall in terms of all memes as well as racist and political ones; 3) A
surprising number of racist memes appear in seemingly “neutral”
communities, e.g., the AdviceAnimals subreddit; 4) Donald Trump
is, by far, the most prevalent political ￿gure in image posts across all
four communities. Moreover, the extended version has appendices
that provide additional details of our screenshot classi￿er as well
as interesting instances of memes and meme clusters.
Performance.We also measured the time that it takes to associate
images posted onWeb communities to memes. All other steps in our
system are one-time batch tasks, only executed if the annotations
dataset is updated. To ease presentation, we only report the time
to compare all the 74M images from Twitter (the largest dataset)
against the medoids of all 12K annotated clusters: it took about
12 days on our infrastructure, equipped with two NVIDIA Titan
Xp GPUs. This corresponds to 14ms per image, or 73 images per
second. Note that, if new GPUs are added to our infrastructure, the
workload would be divided equally across all GPUs.
Future work. In future work, we plan to include memes in video
format, thus extending to other communities (e.g., YouTube). We
also plan to study the content of the posts that contain memes, incor-
porating OCR techniques to capture associated text-based features
that memes usually contain, and improving on KYM annotations
via crowdsourced labeling.
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A CLUSTERING PARAMETER SELECTION
Our implementation uses the DBSCAN algorithm with a clustering
threshold equal to 8. To select this threshold, we perform the clus-
tering step while varying the distances. Table 6 shows the number
of clusters and the percentage of images that are regarded as noise
by the clustering algorithm for varying distances. We observe that
for distances 2-4 we have a substantially larger percentage of noise,
while with distance 10 we have the least percentage of noise. With
distances between 6 and 8 we observe that we get a larger number
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Figure 13: Fraction of false positives in clusters with varying clus-
tering distance.
Distance #Clusters %Noise
2 30,327 82.9%
4 34,146 78.5%
6 37,292 73.0%
8 38,851 62.8%
10 30,737 27.8%
Table 6: Number of clusters and percentage of noise for varying clus-
tering distances.
of clusters than the other distances, while the noise percentages
are 73% and 63%, respectively. To further evaluate the clustering
performance for varying distances, we randomly select 200 clus-
ters and manually calculate the number of images that are false
positives within each cluster. Fig. 13 shows the CDF of the false
positive fraction in the random sample of clusters for distances 6,8,
and 10 (we disregard distances 2-4 due to the high percentage of
noise). We observe that with distance 10 we have an unacceptably
high fraction of false positives, while for distances 6-8 we observe a
similar behavior with slightly more false positives with distance 8
(in both cases the overall false positives are below 3%). A question
that arises here is what is the impact of those false positives in the
overall dataset? To shed light to this question, we ￿nd all posts that
contain false positives and true positives ( from the random sample
of 200 clusters with distance 8). We ￿nd that the false positives have
little impact as they occur substantially fewer times than true posi-
tives: the percentage of true positives over the set of false positives
and true positives is 99.4%. Therefore, due to the larger number of
clusters, the acceptable false positive performance, and the smaller
percentage of noise (when compared to distances 2-6), we elect to
use as a threshold the perceptual distance that is equal to 8.
B KYM AND CLUSTERING ANNOTATION
EVALUATION
While KYM might not be a house hold name, the site is seemingly
the largest curated collection of memes on the Web, i.e., KYM is as
close to an “authority” on memes as there is. That said, crowdsourc-
ing is an aspect of how KYM works, and thus there are questions as
to how “legitimate” some of the content is. To this end, we set out
to measure the quality of KYM by sampling a number of pages and
manually examining them. This is clearly a subjective task, and a
fully speci￿ed de￿nition of what makes a valid meme is approx-
imately as di￿cult as de￿ning “art.” Nevertheless, the authors of
this paper have, for better or worse, collectively spent thousands
of hours immersed in the communities we explore, and thus, while
we are not con￿dent in providing a strict de￿nition of a meme, we
are con￿dent in claiming that we know a meme when we see it.
Using the same randomly selected 200 clusters as mentioned in
Appendix A, we visited each KYM page the cluster was tagged with
and noted whether or not it properly documented what we consider
an “actual” meme. The 200 clusters were mapped to 162 unique
KYM pages, and of these 162 pages, 3 (1.85%) we decided were
“bad.” This is mainly due to the lack of completeness and relatively
high number of random images in the gallery (see [38, 52] for some
examples of “bad” KYM entries).
Next, we set out to determine whether the label (i.e., KYM page)
assigned to each of our randomly sampled clusters was appropriate.
Using three annotators, for each cluster we examined the KYM
page, the medoid of the cluster, and the images in the cluster itself
and noted whether the label does in fact apply to the cluster. Here,
again, there is a great degree of subjectivity. To reign some of the
subjectivity in, we used the following guidelines:
• If the exact image(s) in the cluster appear in the KYM gallery,
then the label is correct.
• For images that do not appear in the KYM gallery, if the label
is appropriate, then it is a correct labeling.
There are some important caveats with these guidelines. First,
KYM galleries are crowdsourced, and while curated to some extent,
the possibility for what amounts to random images in a gallery does
exist; however, based on our assessment of KYM page validity, this
occurs with low probability. Second, we considered a label correct
if it was appropriate, even if it was not necessarily the best possible
label. For example, as our results show, many memes are related,
and many images mix and match pieces of various memes. While
it is de￿nitely true that there might be better labels that exist for
a given cluster, this straightforward and comprehensible labeling
process is su￿cient for our purposes. We leave a more in-depth
study of the subjective nature of memes for future work. Finally, it is
important to note that memes are a cultural phenomenon, thus the
potential for cultural bias in our annotation is possible. To that end,
we note that our annotators were born in three di￿erent countries
(USA, Italy, and Cyprus), only one is a native English speaker, and
two have spent substantial time in the US.
After annotating clusters, we compute the Fleis agreement score
( ). With our cluster samples, we achieve a   of 0.67, which is con-
sidered “substantial” agreement. Finally, for each cluster we obtain
the majority agreement of all annotators to assess the accuracy
of our annotation process; we ￿nd that 89% of the clusters had a
legitimate annotation to a speci￿c KYM entry.
